



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF



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16 AUGUST 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~

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1. North Vietnam

There is additional evidence that Hanoi is not insisting on withdrawal of US troops as a precondition for starting talks.

In an interview published yesterday in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh said that the US must give "tangible proofs" that it accepts the North Vietnamese four points. These "proofs" include "immediate" cessation of US attacks on the north and stoppage "forthwith" of the war against the Viet Cong in the south. Ho also called for withdrawal of US forces, but this was not labelled an "immediate" necessity.

Last week, Hanoi's ambassador to Havana took a similar line. He told a Western diplomat that North Vietnam does "not wish to say that negotiations could start only after" the withdrawal of US forces. However, Hanoi insists on a "sincere declaration" showing that the US respects the Geneva agreements. The ambassador implied that this would involve a unilateral cease-fire by the US.

Soviet officials continue to reflect Moscow's desire for limiting and eventually resolving the war. On 7 August a Soviet Embassy officer in Hanoi urged direct communication between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh in order to break the impasse. He told a Western official that North Vietnamese leaders were beginning to understand that the US would not be pushed out, but they "may well" not have understood completely US policy regarding talks.

The Soviet offered no assurances that a US initiative would be favorably received in Hanoi.

## 2. South Vietnam

The Ky government may find itself embroiled in a major corruption scandal.

The US Embassy has information that both local Vietnamese officials and some government figures in Saigon are implicated in land speculation around Cam Ranh Bay. The speculators--including the wife of War Minister Co--apparently acquired government land at no cost and plan to turn it back with large profits after construction of the US base and port facilities is completed.

## 3. Dominican Republic

Although the OAS negotiating team has made little further headway against rebel intransigence, prospective provisional president Gracia Godoy has not given up hope that his private negotiations with rebel leaders will bear fruit.

Factionalism among the rebels remains a major factor in their stalling. Extremists apparently still hope to gain from a continuation of the present situation.

The Annex today summarizes the attitude of the principal Communist factions toward undertaking guerrilla warfare once a provisional government takes over.

## 4. Greece

The maneuvering to line up support for an alternate to Papandreu continues, with Deputy Prime Minister Stephanopoulos and ex-Interior Minister Tsirimokos still the leading prospects.

[redacted] if either is named by the King, the Communists will take to the streets of central Athens in protest.

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## 5. Kashmir


Skirmishing continues but there is no evidence that infiltrators from Pakistan have been able to muster significant local support.

So far, there is no information [redacted] to confirm press reports that regular Pakistani units as such have made major attacks along the cease-fire line to support the "guerrilla" activity.

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
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6. Yemen

There are further signs that per- 50X1  
sonal talks between Nasir and King Faysal  
may be forthcoming. The King, at least,  
says he "will continue to talk despite  
everything."



7. East Germany

The major exercise of Soviet forces  
appears to have ended today, west of Ber-  
lin. [redacted]


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8. Turkey

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[redacted] Prime Minister  
Urguplu's current visit to the USSR--  
the usual communiqué is due tomorrow.

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## ANNEX

The Outlook for Insurgency in the  
Dominican Republic

The various Communist factions have considerably expanded their capabilities for guerrilla warfare since the insurrection broke out. At the outset, they acquired a large amount of weapons, ammunition, and explosives, and since that time have made a concerted effort to cache this equipment. When the provisional government takes over, the amount of weapons and ammunition available to the extremists probably exceeds the number of trained personnel available for terrorist activity.

The biggest problem facing the Communists is their lack of mass support. The bulk of the populace is conservative and anti-Communist. Most of the people are ready to accept almost any political solution which will bring the country some semblance of order and stability.

The extremists, nevertheless, have made progress in broadening their political base. By hammering at the issue of a "foreign invader" and thus appealing to the inherent nationalism of the people, they have won adherents and sympathizers who would not be attracted by the Marxist call alone. In sum, Communists are still very much in the minority, but they probably feel that they are in a better position now to resort to violence than any time in recent years.

The three Communist parties, however, are not united on the question of guerrilla warfare. The apparent intentions of each of these parties is summarized below:

The Dominican Popular Movement

This hard-line, pro-Chinese party is committed to armed revolution and probably cannot delay much longer some concrete indication that it will follow through. The party probably has about 700 to 900 members drawn largely from poorer urban groups. Almost all its strength is in Santo Domingo.

(Cont'd)

## ANNEX (Cont'd)

By itself, it probably cannot seriously endanger the stability of the country; operations in the interior will likely be unsuccessful and those in Santo Domingo will probably be only of a terrorist and harassing nature, targeted largely against the US presence.

The 14th of June Political Group

The pro-Castro party is believed to have about 2,500 members and a much larger number of sympathizers. Many of its leaders have had guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.

This group is divided whether to undertake large-scale insurgency operations. It has the best capability to do so in terms of membership, training, and experience. If its hard-line faction gets control, the party will represent a much greater threat than would the Dominican Popular Movement. If the two groups should combine forces, they could cause disruptions which would seriously impair the effectiveness of the provisional government, although they probably could not bring the government down.

The Dominican Communist Party

This is the Moscow-oriented party; it has between 700 and 1,000 members. For tactical reasons it advocates a moderate approach to an ultimate Communist victory. It is unlikely at this point that this group would undertake a serious insurgency campaign. However, if the other two parties should have success with guerrilla operations, the Dominican Communists might reconsider.

Taking the interplay among and within the three groups into account, it appears that Dominican military and police forces will probably be able to prevent insurgent activity from posing a serious threat. However, if the new regime resorts to harsh repressive measures and the economic situation does not improve, the extremists might gain enough outside support to threaten the provisional government.

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